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IS EU COORDINATION 
NEEDED FOR 
CORPORATE 
TAXATION? 
Albert van der Horst 
 Should EU-member states give up their rights to design their own 
corporate income tax? Currently, member states are free to set their 
tax rates and are allowed to design their tax base as long as it does 
not constitute harmful tax competition. This is regulated in the Code 
of Conduct, which is not a legally binding instrument but does have 
political force. By adopting this Code, the member states have 
undertaken to roll back existing tax measures that constitute harmful 
tax competition and refrain from introducing any such measures in 
the future.1  
1. 
Introduction
Should the European Union go beyond this minimum and 
coordinate the taxes on corporate income? In the policy debate, a 
distinction is made between coordination of tax rates and of tax 
bases. The stance on tax rates is a clear “hands off”, because tax 
rates are deemed to be the sole responsibility of the member states. 
The stance on the tax base is less clear-cut as the European 
Commission (2002, 2006) aims at consolidation.  
This paper questions this current stance on both the rate and the 
base of the corporate income tax by investigating the economic 
aspects of both. Is tax rate harmonisation, or alternatively a 
minimum rate, justified on economic grounds? Would tax base 
consolidation be a step forward, improving efficiency in the 
European Union? One of the issues in tax coordination, as in other 
policies, is the distribution of economic effects over the member 
states. In this paper, we pay special attention to the implications of 
corporate tax reforms for Ireland. 
1 Quoted from:  
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/harmful_tax_ 
practices/index_en.htm 
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In the remaining sections of this paper, we first introduce our 
tool, a general equilibrium model for corporate tax policy in the 
European Union. Using this tool, we investigate the economic 
effects of uncoordinated and coordinated changes in the tax rate and 
of consolidation of the tax base. 
 
 The key economic mechanisms relating to the behaviour of 
enterprises, households and the government and the functioning of 
markets are represented in a general equilibrium model, named 
CORTAX.2 This model allows for a numerical assessment of the 
economic effects of tax reforms in the European Union. We 
summarise the main features of the model as follows:3 
2. 
Our Line of 
Reasoning
The model distinguishes 17 European countries (the EU15, with 
Belgium and Luxembourg combined and Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic) and the United States. The model is calibrated for 
2002. It includes the statutory tax rate and a measure of tax 
deductions. Together, they determine the marginal effective tax rate 
(METR), which is calibrated in line with Devereux et al. (2002). The 
model investigates the investment response of firms to changes in 
the tax rate or tax base. The model distinguishes between domestic 
and multinational firms, which may be affected differently by tax 
reforms. 
There are three channels through which tax policies in one 
member state affect other member states. 
• Foreign direct investment by multinational firms is 
sensitive to differences in the effective tax rates between 
member states.  
• Profit shifting is a second channel: differences in the 
statutory rates induce multinational enterprises to shift 
profits to low-tax countries via transfer pricing. 
• The third channel is foreign ownership, as firms are partly 
owned by households in other member states. 
Corporate taxation affects the labour market as investment and 
labour demand are closely linked (the substitution elasticity between 
capital and labour is assumed to be 0.7). A higher corporate tax 
therefore reduces the demand for labour and depresses wages. 
Following the standard overlapping generations model of 
Diamond, households are assumed to live for two periods. In the 
first period, households split their time between employment and 
leisure. They spend their after-tax labour and profit income on 
consumption and savings. Consumption in the second period is 
financed by capital income (net of taxes) and lump sum transfers. 
The main sources of income for the government are the taxes on 
labour income, consumption and corporate income. The main 
expenditures are government consumption and income transfers to 
2 Details set out in Appendix 2. 
3 See Bettendorf and Van der Horst (2006) for more details on the model and its 
calibration. 
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households. We assume in the simulations that budget deficits (or 
surpluses) are financed through a change in the tax rate on labour 
income.4 
We use the model to investigate the long-run implications of 
corporate tax reforms, and abstract from the transitional dynamics. 
In sum, the model investigates the economy-wide impact of 
corporate taxation, focusing on the interactions between domestic 
firms, multinational enterprises, households and the government, 
both within and between member states. Both the economic effects 
and the distributional implications of tax reforms across countries 
may be investigated. 
 
 Capital market integration within the European Union has been 
successful. It has brought about a superior allocation of capital over 
member states by linking capital markets. But capital market 
integration also links national capital-income taxes. In response, 
member states have reduced their statutory corporate income-tax 
rates in order to attract foreign direct investment and the paper 
profits of multinational firms.5 Should the European Union respond 
by coordinating tax rates? 
3. 
Competition in 
Tax Rates 
There might be scope for European coordination of corporate 
income tax (CIT) rates if counties harm each other by unilateral tax 
policies. We investigate this by looking at the spillovers from 
unilateral reductions in the CIT-rate. In addition, we show how 
strong the incentives are for member states to unilaterally reduce 
their CIT-rate. Finally, we switch the focus from national policies to 
European coordination, by investigating whether the EU would 
benefit from a minimum CIT-rate, or from harmonisation.6 
Does unilateral tax rate policy harm or benefit other member 
states? A tax rate reduction may benefit the foreign owners of 
domestically operating firms, whose after-tax profits increase. 
Moreover, capital-exporting countries may benefit from a tax reform 
if a tax-cut leads to an increase in the return to capital. This ‘if’ 
scenario holds, however, only for countries that are large enough to 
unilaterally affect the world interest rate, which is quite unlikely, even 
for large European countries. 
On the other hand, countries may attract foreign capital at the 
expense of others, as investments flow towards locations with the 
highest net rate of return. Again, how strongly other countries are 
affected depends on the relative size of both countries: a tax rate 
reduction in say Finland may boost investment at home, but will 
 
4 The results in this paper are qualitatively similar if the budget is closed with a 
change in the consumption tax rate. Outcomes are different with lump-sum 
financing which is a nondistortionary source of financing. 
5 Empirical studies show that a percentage point reduction in the corporate tax rate 
raises inward FDI by about 2.4 per cent (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003) and profits 
by about 1.4 per cent (Huizinga and Laeven, 2007). 
6 This section is based on Bettendorf et al. (2006), to which we also refer for 
references to the literature. 
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hardly harm large countries like Germany and France. A second 
potential harmful spillover is profit shifting, whereby countries 
reduce their CIT-rate in order to attract highly-mobile paper profits 
of multinational firms. Important vehicles of profit shifting are 
transfer pricing, where multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate 
the prices of their intra-firm deliveries, and thin capitalisation, where 
MNEs have excessive debt in high-tax countries in order to benefit 
from interest deductions. 
In order to see whether spillovers are on average harmful or 
beneficial, we simulate in CORTAX a unilateral reduction in the 
CIT-rate – financed by an increase in the labour tax.7 We run this 
simulation for each member state separately and each time the 
question is whether other countries gain or lose.  
Figure 1 shows that the harmful spillovers dominate the 
beneficial spillovers, as the unilateral reduction in one member state 
reduces welfare (as measured by the “equivalent variation” of the 
reform as a proportion of GDP) in the others (the rest of the EU). 
The size of the effect is limited, though, up to 0.02 per cent of 
European GDP for tax-rate reductions in the United Kingdom and 
Germany, which are large countries with a highly distortionary 
corporate tax system (as measured by the METR).8  
Why do we find that spillovers are so small? It is not because 
profit shifting is unimportant: it is important, according to the 
empirical literature on which we have calibrated our model. It is not 
because FDI does not respond to tax rates: it does.9 However, an 
increase in FDI in one country has a limited impact on each other 
country because the overall supply of foreign capital, from Europe 
and the world, is so large. Only if all EU member states jointly 
reduce their tax rates might a serious repercussion on FDI in non-
EU countries obtain. The final reason for the limited spillovers is the 
relatively small share of foreign direct investment (less than 10 per 
cent on average) in total investments. The gains from the CIT-
reduction primarily accrue to domestic firms that do not have the 
possibility to transfer profits or expand foreign direct investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
7 The most important reason for including the labour tax as a budget-balancing 
device is to include the notion that corporate tax revenues cannot be diminished 
without affecting the economy elsewhere. Alternatively, we have simulated the 
reforms with consumption-taxes as a budget-balancing device, which yields mainly 
similar results. 
8 The change in welfare is measured as the equivalent variation as a percentage of 
GDP, i.e. the amount of money given to (or taken from) households in each 
country which would give them the same welfare improvement (or reduction) as in 
the policy scenario.  
9 See also De Mooij (2005) for a survey of the literature on the responsiveness of 
profits and FDI to corporate taxation. 
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Figure 1: Welfare Effect of Unilateral CIT-Rate Reduction (Equivalent 
Variation as a Percentage of GDP) 
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Do member states themselves gain from a tax-rate reduction? 
Although one might expect the answer to be affirmative, the case is 
not that clear-cut. On the benefit side, the losses for the other 
member states reflect a gain for the tax-reducing country: it benefits 
more from profit shifting than it loses from capital exporting. In 
addition, the tax distortion on domestic and foreign investment is 
reduced. On the other hand, if a member state decides to engage in 
tax competition and reduces its CIT-rate, then it must fill the 
resulting budgetary hole, either by cutting public expenditure or by 
increasing the burden of alternative taxes. Alternative means of 
financing, like raising taxes on labour income or consumption, 
typically dampen the gains from unilateral CIT-reforms.  
Again, we rely on simulations to quantify which effect dominates 
in the domestic effects of cutting corporate tax rates. As before, we 
concentrate on the situation where a single member state reduces its 
tax rate and other member states do not respond. Table 1 reports the 
“home country” effects for a selection of countries , e.g. the first 
column shows the implications for Ireland of a unilateral tax 
reduction in Ireland.  
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Table 1: Economic Effects of a Unilateral Reduction of the CIT-Rate by 5 
Percentage Points10 
      
 IRL GBR NLD FRA DEU 
Corporate tax revenues (% GDP) -0.54 -0.26 -0.24 -0.25 -0.35 
Labour tax rate (%-point) 1.10 0.53 0.22 0.66 0.61 
Consumption (%) -0.24 -0.02 0.43 -0.31 0.26 
Employment (%) -0.14 -0.12 -0.03 -0.32 -0.12 
Wage rate (%) 0.95 0.54 0.73 0.55 1.09 
Capital stock (%) 1.53 1.49 1.76 0.89 2.24 
GDP (%) 0.78 0.35 0.65 0.11 0.68 
Inward FDI (%) 10.10 6.83 5.00 5.33 5.48 
Welfare1 (% GDP) -0.10 0.05 0.30 -0.07 0.21 
      
1The change in welfare is measured as the equivalent variation as per cent GDP, i.e., the 
amount of money given to (or taken from) households in each country which would give 
them the same welfare improvement (or reduction) as the policy reform under 
consideration. 
 
The first row indicates that the tax-rate reduction implies a loss 
of tax revenues, which are compensated for in this scenario with an 
increase in the labour tax rate. The required increase in Ireland is 
relatively strong: a 5 per cent reduction is relatively large when 
starting from the current rate of 12.5 per cent. Moreover, as Irish 
corporate taxes are already on the low end of the international 
spectrum, a further reduction is unlikely to attract more paper 
profits. For Germany, a country which is harmed by profit shifting, a 
reduction in the corporate tax rate implies a reduction in profit 
shifting, which partly refunds the CIT-cut. The cut in the corporate 
tax rate, even though it is complemented with a labour-tax increase, 
enhances investment (both domestic and from abroad) and 
production in nearly every member state (with the exception of 
Greece and Italy). In the labour market wages go up but 
employment declines in response to the increase in the labour tax 
rate. Consumption and welfare decline in a couple of countries, 
including Ireland. The increase in the wage rate is insufficient to 
compensate for the reduction in disposable income induced by the 
higher labour tax rate. 
So, the answer to the question of whether member states 
themselves gain from a tax-rate reduction is mixed. It depends first 
of all on the alternative measures to close the budget deficit of the 
government. If the government has the option to reduce lump sum 
income transfers to households, where lump sum means that the 
transfer is unrelated to households’ income or wealth, then each 
member state benefits from its own reduction of the CIT-rate. In a 
more realistic scenario, governments have to raise the labour tax rate 
(or an alternative distortionary tax rate) to compensate for the 
 
10An extensive table with results for all countries is given in Table A1.1 in Appendix 
1. 
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revenue loss of the corporate income tax. This tax reform benefits 
only countries with a highly distortionary corporate tax system, i.e., 
with a high tax rate and/or a broad tax base (see ‘home country’ in 
Figure 1). Examples are Germany, the Netherlands (before the 
recent tax reforms) and Belgium, all of which have an incentive to 
reduce their CIT-rate. Countries like Ireland and several Eastern-
European member states with low tax rates have nothing to gain 
from a CIT reduction. For them it is better to cut the labour tax rate 
than the tax on corporate income.  
Will there be a race to the bottom? The previous discussion 
shows that, starting at the current tax rates, not all countries benefit 
from cutting tax rates. Supplementary simulations in Bettendorf et al. 
(2006) reveal that even the member states that do benefit from a tax-
rate reduction will not completely abandon the tax on corporate 
income. At lower CIT-rates, the distortions in the alternative taxes 
on consumption and labour exceed the distortionary effects of the 
corporate income tax on investment and profit shifting. So, no 
member state will unilaterally abandon its tax on corporate income. 
Things might change, however, if countries respond to each 
other. Suppose that all other countries cut their corporate tax rates, 
should the remaining country respond by cutting its tax rate too? 
The answer is yes, but only slightly. Yes, because the negative 
spillovers from tax-reforms in other countries can be undone by 
cutting one’s own tax rate too. Slightly, because domestic reasons for 
taxing corporate income (i.e. generating revenues which would 
otherwise have to be raised in other, distortionary ways) prevent a 
strong response. The answer is, therefore, that there will be a race, 
but not to the bottom. 
Given that the spillovers are limited and the incentives for 
unilateral tax-rate reductions are small, is there any room for 
coordination? Table 2 shows the welfare effects for the EU and a 
selection of countries of four coordination policies. The first row 
shows the welfare effects of unilateral tax rate reductions (in each 
member state separately). 
Table 2: Welfare Effects (% GDP) of Tax Rate Coordination (in a Selection of 
Countries)11 
       
 IRL GBR NLD FRA DEU EU 
Unilateral tax reform (-5%-point) -0.10 0.05 0.30 -0.07 0.21  
Multilateral tax reform (-5%-point) -0.22 -0.02 0.07 -0.15 0.15 -0.04 
Minimum tax rate (30%) -0.28 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Harmonised tax rate (33%) -0.46 -0.08 0.14 -0.02 0.25 0.00 
Harmonised tax rate (20%) -0.22 -0.11 0.06 -0.69 0.13 -0.29 
       
 
The second row shows the welfare effects of a coordinated 
reduction of the tax rate by 5 percentage points. The potential 
domestic gains from a cut in the CIT-rate are significantly reduced in 
 
11 The extensive table with results for all countries is given in Table A1.2 in Appendix 1. 
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a context where this cut is undertaken by all other EU member 
states. In this case, the inability to attract foreign profit income 
reduces the benefits from favourable tax planning by multinational 
enterprises. This implies that for most countries a reduction in the 
tax rate creates a welfare loss. A multilateral reduction in the tax rate 
is beneficial only for countries with a highly distortionary CIT-tax, 
like Germany, Most countries will, therefore, refrain from tax 
competition if they realise that other countries are likely to respond 
to their tax cut by making a tax cut of their own. 
The next three rows show the welfare effects of three 
coordination policies: introducing a minimum tax rate, 
harmonisation of the tax rate at the current average (33 per cent) or 
harmonisation at a much lower level (20 per cent). The simulations 
clearly show that the EU will not benefit from tax rate coordination, 
and may even lose if the harmonised tax rate is set ‘too low’. 
From an economic point of view, competition in tax rates is 
hardly worth pursuing by individual member states at current levels 
of corporate-income taxation, and even less so at a lower level of 
taxation.12 Moreover, the spillovers are harmful but limited. Policies 
to remedy tax competition, like setting a minimum tax rate or even 
harmonising the CIT-rates, therefore, hardly enhance growth and 
welfare in the European Union: the winners just gain enough to 
compensate the losers. 
 
 Companies operating across the internal market are hampered by 
tax obstacles such as high compliance costs for cross-border 
operations, transfer pricing and the lack of cross-border loss 
compensation. These obstacles are inherent in the current system of 
separate accounting (SA), where the corporate income of foreign 
subsidiaries is treated separately for tax purposes. 
4. 
Tax Base
In its 2002 Tax Communication, the European Commission 
(2002) proposed consolidation of the tax base as an answer to the 
inherent difficulties of separate accounting and large compliance 
costs. Consolidation implies that all taxable profits of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are added up into a single base. Key choices 
which have to be made by the member states are on the definition of 
the single base (either according to the tax rules of the parent 
country or according to new European rules) and on the question 
whether the consolidated European base will be introduced instead 
of, or in addition to, national tax rules. We shed some light on both 
issues from an economist’s point of view.13 
Consolidation implies that the subsidiaries of an European 
multinational are treated as a single entity for tax purposes. This 
12 The limited scope for tax competition stemming from the CORTAX-simulation 
stands in contrast to the current reductions in statutory tax rates, but is in line with 
the limited reduction in effective tax rates and corporate tax revenues, see 
Nicodème (2006). 
13 See Van der Horst et al. (2007) for an extensive analysis of the economic effects 
of consolidation. 
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brings several gains, both for multinational enterprises and for 
governments. First, multinationals save on compliance costs, as they 
have to file only one (consolidated) corporate income tax return, 
where all affiliates are included.14 Second, cross-border losses are 
automatically offset with tax base consolidation. Currently this is not 
the case, as member states may prevent a parent company from 
deducting from its taxable profits losses incurred by a subsidiary in 
another member state. This differs from the treatment of resident 
subsidiaries whose losses may generally be deducted from the 
companies’ profits. Finally, consolidation makes profit shifting for 
tax purposes obsolete, as all profits are added up into a single tax 
base. This implies that transfer pricing, i.e., charging different prices 
for intra-firm exports than for regular exports, becomes redundant. 
Governments in high-tax countries are the main beneficiaries of the 
latter effect, as firms are unable to minimise tax payments by shifting 
profits to low-tax member states. 
Consolidation also has several drawbacks, which crucially 
depends on its design. The largest gains from consolidation might be 
expected if all enterprises, both domestic and multinational, are 
treated equally. Proposals for consolidation which do not treat all 
firms equally may create distortions, which induce a large 
restructuring both within and between member states. An example 
of this is the EU-proposal of home state taxation, where firms have 
to make their tax declaration according to the rules of their home 
country. Clearly, domestic firms and multinational headquarters are 
treated equally, but unevenness is introduced between subsidiaries 
with different home states. This proposal gives preferential 
treatment to subsidiaries originating from member states with a 
narrow tax base. 
A second issue is whether consolidation is optional or 
compulsory for multinationals. Multinationals are likely to prefer the 
first option, where they may choose the tax system, either national or 
European, which suits them best. Here the disadvantages are for 
governments: they have to deal with two tax systems and their tax 
revenues will decline as firms will exploit the opportunity to 
minimise their tax payments.  
The third issue is the definition of the common base including 
the amount of tax deductions. If consolidation is compulsory, then a 
broad tax base benefits governments, whose CIT-revenues increase, 
but implies a higher tax burden for MNEs which have to cut down 
production. Simulations with CORTAX reveal that the latter effect 
dominates, such that welfare in the EU declines if the tax base is 
broadened. The combination of a voluntary system and a broad tax 
base, however, is likely to imply that very few MNEs will shift 
towards the common consolidated base, which would make the 
reform superfluous. 
 
14 We abstract from the major step of harmonising the tax return and the 
underlying accounting system, which is of course a major issue in the transition 
from separate accounting to consolidation. 
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Maybe the most important issue is that a common consolidated 
base limits the tax autonomy of member states. As a solution, 
member states are allowed to tax a fraction of the consolidated base 
at their own rate. This requires the apportioning of the consolidated 
base to the member states, presumably through some kind of 
apportionment formula which distributes the tax base between the 
member states. Some measure of economic activity is used to 
determine which fraction of the consolidated base is generated in 
each jurisdiction and may therefore be taxed by each jurisdiction. 
Formula apportionment creates new tax planning possibilities for 
MNEs. Tax planning is the ability of firms to minimise their tax 
obligations by shifting profits or economic activity across 
jurisdictions. Transfer pricing, the most common means of tax 
planning in the current system of separate accounting, would 
become meaningless with the consolidation of the tax base. 
However, with formula apportionment, the share of the tax base 
apportioned to each jurisdiction can be influenced by shifting 
economic activity from one jurisdiction to another. Even though real 
economic activity, like production or FDI, can be shifted less easily 
than paper profits to other member states, its economic impact is 
larger. The change in the tax planning strategy of MNEs, by 
reallocation instead of transfer pricing, therefore reduces welfare in 
the EU. 
A likely response of governments to the tax-planning strategies of 
MNEs is to cut their tax rates. In the current system of separate 
accounting, countries may thus attract paper profits and FDI. In the 
consolidated system with formula apportionment, the possibilities 
for (paper) profit shifting are limited, but the incentives for FDI are 
reinforced.  
Adopting a system of consolidated base taxation with formula 
apportionment allows the Commission to achieve its goals in a single 
stroke (Martens-Weiner, 2006): corporate taxation is simplified for 
multinationals and autonomy in fiscal policy is guaranteed for 
governments. Is consolidation a good policy option? 
For an answer to this question we again rely on simulations with 
CORTAX. We first investigate a scenario where MNEs adopt a 
common consolidated base whereas domestic firms stick to the 
national tax rules. The tax allowances in the common base are fixed 
at the current EU average. The apportionment formula is defined on 
three factors, namely employment, capital and production of MNEs 
in each member state, with equal weight.15 A summary of the 
economic effects in a selection of countries is shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 
15 The production factor resembles apportionment on value added or sales by 
origin. The alternative factor of sales by destination could not be investigated in the 
current version of CORTAX. Van der Horst et al. (2007) includes simulations for 
each apportionment factor (employment, capital and production) separately. 
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Table 3: Economic Effects of a Common Consolidated Tax Base (Reported for a 
Selection of Countries)16 
       
 IRL GBR NLD FRA DEU EU 
Corporate tax revenue (% 
GDP) -0.37 -0.14 -0.26 0.01 -0.56 -0.07 
Labour tax rate (%-point) 0.20 0.01 0.23 0.19 0.48 0.11 
Wage rate (%) 0.79 0.36 0.51 -0.08 0.95 0.18 
Employment (%) 0.28 0.06 -0.09 -0.17 0.03 -0.01 
Capital (%) 0.52 1.04 1.45 -0.29 2.62 0.51 
GDP (%) 0.44 0.27 0.33 -0.19 0.76 0.10 
Welfare (% GDP) 0.06 0.18 0.21 -0.11 0.12 0.02 
       
 
The first gain, which holds for all multinationals in all countries, 
is a reduction in compliance costs. It is cheaper for multinationals to 
fill in one tax return for the EU than many different tax returns for 
each member state. There is little evidence on the size of this effect. 
The European Commission (2004) reports evidence on perceived 
compliance costs (these include costs required for company taxation 
and VAT, next to costs voluntarily incurred to minimise taxes). 
Compliance costs are estimated to range between 1.9 per cent and 
30.9 per cent of taxes paid by large firms and SMEs, respectively. 
Costs are larger for firms with subsidiaries. In the simulations with 
CORTAX, we assume that the compliance costs of subsidiaries are 
eliminated by tax-base consolidation, which incurs a welfare gain of 
0.04 per cent of GDP in the EU. 
The second potential gain might be a reduction in tax planning, 
which in the current system operates primarily via transfer pricing. 
Consolidation eliminates tax planning via transfer pricing, but creates 
new opportunities via formula apportionment. Firms would expand 
production or sales in member states with low statutory rates. For 
example, FDI would increase by 25 per cent in Ireland, but would 
decline by 5 per cent in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
This reallocation aggravates tax competition, which is stronger in a 
consolidated tax system than in the current system of separate 
accounting. 
The economic effects of consolidation with formula 
apportionment are unevenly distributed, both between and within 
countries. With separate accounting, low tax countries are attractive 
for the location of paper profits. With formula apportionment, 
however, low tax countries are attractive for the location of 
production (and production factors): higher production in low-tax 
countries enlarges the apportioned share of the tax base in these 
jurisdictions and thus reduces the average tax payments of MNEs. 
This expansion of MNEs implies an increase in GDP, employment 
 
16 The extensive table with results for all countries is given in Table A1.3 in 
Appendix 1. 
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and capital in low-tax countries. In contrast, production in high-tax 
countries declines.  
This uneven distribution of gains and losses due to formula 
apportionment adds up to the unbalanced impact of the 
commonness of the consolidated base. Currently, the tax deductions 
differ significantly between member states. For countries with 
generous tax deductions, like Italy and Greece, a common European 
base likely implies a broadening of the tax base. This raises their 
effective tax rate and suppresses investments. The opposite likely 
holds for member states with limited tax allowances, like Germany 
and Ireland. Both the change to formula apportionment and the 
asymmetry in the tax base imply that the change in welfare ranges 
between a reduction of 0.4 per cent of GDP (in Greece) and an 
increase of 0.4 per cent of GDP (in Belgium and Luxembourg).  
The uneven distribution might possibly be overcome by 
redistribution if the total gains for the EU are positive. However, 
Europe hardly benefits on average from the common consolidated 
base taxation. The gains from a reduction in compliance costs and 
the elimination of transfer pricing are offset by the efficiency losses 
from reallocation. Corporate tax revenues decline on average by 
about 2 per cent due to the expansion of firms in member states 
with low tax rates and/or narrow tax bases. Alternative means of 
financing have to be found in order to balance the government 
budget. The resulting gains in GDP and welfare are small, 
respectively 0.05 per cent and 0.01 per cent of GDP.17 This shows 
that the gains from consolidation can be offset by the details of its 
design. 
Figure 2: Impact of EUCIT on GDP (black bar,%) and Welfare (Equivalent 
Variation as a % of GDP, grey bar) 
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17 The impact on GDP (percentage change) and welfare (measured in percentage 
GDP) of a tax reform generally point in the same direction. A large employment 
increase, however, improves GDP but declines welfare due to a loss of leisure. 
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The full benefits from consolidation can only be reaped if all 
firms participate and apply a common tax base. Moreover, the 
incentives for reallocating production are minimised if the 
apportionment formula resembles the distribution of corporate 
income of MNEs. Further gains can be achieved by a more radical 
approach, which tackles the tax-planning issue at source, by 
harmonising the tax rates in addition to consolidating the tax base.18 
In this far-reaching scenario, known as the European Union 
Corporate Income Tax (EUCIT), a welfare gain of 0.14 per cent 
GDP can be obtained, as shown in Figure 2. Still, the variation in 
economic effects is large: countries which switch from a small base 
to the common base (which is in this scenario defined at the EU-
average) will lose, up to 1 per cent GDP in Greece. On the other 
hand, countries with a broad base tend to gain, up to 0.8 per cent in 
Germany. The distribution of winners and losers does not depend 
clearly on the initial tax rate. For example, EUCIT will improve 
welfare in low-tax countries like Poland (+0.35 per cent GDP) and 
Hungary (+0.47 per cent GDP), but not in Ireland (-0.14 per cent 
GDP). In Ireland, the gains from having a more efficient European 
corporate tax system would not compensate for abandoning the 
current system. 
 
 Should member states give up their right to design their corporate 
income tax? We pick up this question, by confronting corporate 
taxation with the subsidiarity test (Ederveen et al., 2006).  
5. 
Subsidiarity in 
Corporate 
Taxation The first question is: are there economies of scale in corporate taxation? Indeed there are, in particular in the consolidation of the 
tax base. With separate accounting, firms have to file tax returns in 
each country in which they have subsidiaries. With consolidation, 
firms save on these fixed costs by filing one return for the European 
Union.  
The second question is: do countries affect each other, or how 
important are the externalities from corporate taxation? The section 
on tax-rate reforms extensively discusses this issue, showing that the 
beggar-thy-neighbour externalities of a tax rate reduction dominate. 
By cutting taxes, member states are able to attract profits and foreign 
direct investment (partly) at the expense of other countries. 
However, the size of these spillovers are limited, and do not justify 
coordination of CIT-rates. 
Quantitatively more important are the spillovers from tax 
planning with formula apportionment. Countries have a stronger 
incentive to underbid each other’s tax rates, in an attempt to attract 
investment, production and (possibly) employment from other 
 
18 The simulation shows that consolidation with tax rate harmonisation is better 
than without unifying tax rates. We do not show that completely unifying tax rates 
is the first-best policy. For example, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) show that larger, 
richer and less peripheral countries are more attractive to market-seeking MNEs 
and may, therefore, set higher corporate tax rates. We thank the referee for pointing 
out this qualification. 
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member states. Both answers weakly support coordination of 
corporate taxation at the European level. 
An important motivation for national policies is the adaptation to 
local circumstances. Does the heterogeneity of member states 
support decentralised corporate tax systems? Several elements of this 
heterogeneity are included in the analysis of this paper. First, the 
analysis of tax base consolidation clearly shows that its gains depend 
on the heterogeneity in tax rates: low-tax countries tend to gain 
more. Second, the gains from an unilateral reduction in the tax rate 
depends on a country’s openness: member states with strong foreign 
investment linkages have more to gain, but also more to lose, from 
tax rate reforms. Openness affects the size, rather than the direction, 
of the economic effects of tax reforms: more open economies gain 
more or lose more than relatively closed ones. The final 
heterogeneity that proves to be important is the different starting 
situation.19 For example, a common base generally benefits member 
states which now have a broad base, but harms member states with a 
narrow tax base. This difference in the initial situation not only 
determines the distribution of the economic effects, but might also  
reflect national preferences for corporate tax policy or might depend 
on local circumstances. Probably, an egalitarian society might prefer 
a broad tax base and/or a high tax rate, whereas a liberal society 
might choose the opposite in an attempt to boost economic growth. 
Therefore, there are insufficient reasons to coordinate the CIT-
rate at the European level, unless tax bases are consolidated in the 
first place. Whether or not consolidation should be introduced 
depends: we show that consolidation is beneficial (in particular in 
combination with tax-rate harmonisation), but overrules the primacy 
of member states in corporate tax policy. An attempt to run with the 
hare and hunt with the hounds by consolidating the base but leaving 
tax-rate policy to be set at the level of the member states, is unlikely 
to boost welfare in the EU. 
 
 EU Commission proposals on the reform of corporate taxation 
have centred on a common, consolidated corporate tax base for EU 
countries, but with each country free to choose the rate of tax. This 
proposal has been analysed using CORTAX, an economic model 
which allows for economic responses, including changes in foreign 
direct investment flows and in the location of paper profits. The 
findings suggest that gains from this approach are offset by losses of 
about equal magnitude; some countries would gain, but others would 
lose. Harmonisation of tax rates or a minimum tax rate would lead 
to similar results, or even to net losses. When consolidation of the 
tax base is combined with a harmonised tax rate, there is scope for 
small aggregate gains at EU level (of the order of 0.14 per cent of 
6. 
Conclusions 
19 This list of heterogeneity is not complete. The contribution by Pouget et al., in 
this volume points at differences in public infrastructure, which may be (partly) 
financed by corporate income taxes. 
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GDP). However, the effects vary across countries, with some 
countries gaining, and others, including Ireland, losing from such a 
reform. 
REFERENCES 
BALDWIN, R. and P. KRUGMAN, 2004. “Agglomeration, 
Integration and Tax Harmonisation”, European Economic Review, 
Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 1-23. 
BETTENDORF, L. and A. VAN DER HORST, 2006. 
"Documentation of CORTAX", CPB Memorandum 161. 
BETTENDORF, L., J. GORTER and A. VAN DER HORST, 2006. 
"Who Benefits from Tax Competition in the European Union?" 
CPB document 125. 
DE MOOIJ, R.A., 2005. Will Corporate Income Taxation Survive? De 
Economist, Vol. 153, No. pp. 277-301. 
DE MOOIJ, R. and S. EDERVEEN, 2003. "Taxation and Foreign 
Direct Investment: a Synthesis of Empirical Research", International 
Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 10, pp. 673-693. 
DEVEREUX, M., R. GRIFFITH and A. KLEMM, 2002. "Corporate 
Income Tax: Reform and Tax Competition", Economic Policy, Vol. 
35, pp. 451–495. 
EDERVEEN, S., G. GELAUFF and J. PELKMANS, 2006. 
"Assessing Subsidiarity," CPB Document 133. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001. "Estimates of compliance cost 
for international and cross-border economic activity", Annex 2 of 
COM-582, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/ 
documents/annexes_en.pdf  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002. "Company Taxation in the 
Internal Market", Communication COM(2001) 582 final. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004. European Tax Survey, Taxation 
Papers 3. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006. "Implementing the Community 
Lisbon Programme: Progress to date and next steps towards a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base" (CCCTB), 
Communication COM(2006) 157 FINAL. 
FINKENZELLER, M. and C. SPENGEL, 2004. "Measuring the 
Effective Levels of Company Taxation in the New Member States: 
A Quantitative Analysis", Working Paper 7/2004, European 
Commission. 
HUIZINGA, H. and L. LAEVEN, 2007. "International Profit Shifting 
within European Multinationals", CEPR Discussion Paper 6048. 
MARTENS-WEINER, J., 2006. Company Tax Reform in the European 
Union: Guidance from the United States and Canada on Implementing 
Formula Apportionment in the EU, New York: Springer. 
62 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2008 
 
NEXIA INTERNATIONAL, 2005, International Handbook of Corporate 
and Personal Taxes, UK: Tottel.  
NICODÈME, G., 2006. "Corporate Tax Competition and 
Coordination in the European Union: What do we know? Where 
do we stand?", DG ECFIN Economic Papers 250. 
POUGET, F. and Stéclebout-Orseau, E. 2006. "Corporate Tax 
Coordination and Differentiated Public Good Provision", available 
at http://www.cpb.nl/nl/activ/subsidiarity/papers/taxation/ 
pouget.pdf 
SØRENSEN, P.B., 2002. "The German Business Tax Reform of 2000 
- a General Equilibrium Analysis", German Economic Review, Vol. 3, 
pp. 347-378. 
VAN DER HORST, A., L. BETTENDORF and H. ROJAS-
ROMAGOSA, 2007. "Will Corporate Tax Consolidation Improve 
Efficiency in the EU?" CPB Document 141. 
 63 
 
APPENDIX 1: 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
This Appendix supplements the tables in the main text by 
presenting the economic effects of tax-rate and base reforms for 17 
EU-countries: the EU15-countries with Belgium and Luxembourg 
combined (in BLU), Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
Table A1.1: Economic Effects of Unilateral Reduction of the CIT-Rate with 5 Percentage-
Points 
          
 CIT L-tax C L W K Y FDI Welfare 
  % GDP %-point % % % % % % GDP % GDP 
AUT -0.22 0.45 -0.13 -0.18 0.43 0.93 0.20 6.42 -0.03 
BLU -0.19 0.14 0.33 0.00 0.56 1.50 0.75 6.52 0.23 
DNK -0.26 0.69 -0.26 -0.26 0.53 1.02 0.22 5.54 -0.09 
FIN -0.34 0.67 0.00 -0.19 0.92 1.68 0.52 5.91 0.07 
FRA -0.25 0.66 -0.31 -0.32 0.55 0.89 0.11 5.33 -0.07 
DEU -0.35 0.61 0.26 -0.12 1.09 2.24 0.68 5.48 0.21 
GRC -0.03 0.32 -0.40 -0.20 -0.14 -0.55 -0.28 5.32 -0.18 
IRL -0.54 1.10 -0.24 -0.14 0.95 1.53 0.78 10.10 -0.10 
ITA -0.08 0.44 -0.34 -0.29 0.13 -0.03 -0.18 3.26 -0.10 
NLD -0.24 0.22 0.43 -0.03 0.73 1.76 0.65 5.00 0.30 
PRT -0.11 0.37 -0.10 -0.11 0.26 0.73 0.15 5.48 -0.02 
ESP -0.21 0.66 -0.15 -0.21 0.58 0.99 0.23 5.79 -0.01 
SWE -0.21 0.62 -0.45 -0.32 0.38 0.68 0.08 5.96 -0.19 
GBR -0.26 0.53 -0.02 -0.12 0.54 1.49 0.35 6.83 0.05 
CZE -0.19 0.75 -0.15 -0.17 0.80 1.31 0.43 6.84 -0.02 
HUN -0.20 0.84 -0.22 -0.19 0.88 1.57 0.48 9.34 -0.05 
POL -0.14 0.73 -0.17 -0.15 0.68 1.41 0.36 9.03 -0.04 
          
CIT: corporate tax revenues; L-tax: labour tax rate; C: consumption; L: employment; W: wage rate; K: capital 
stock; Y: gross domestic product; FDI: inward foreign direct investment. 
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Table A.1.2: Welfare Effects (% GDP) of Tax Rate Coordination 
      
  
Unilateral Tax 
Reform (-5%-
Point) 
Multilateral 
Tax Reform (-
5%-Point) 
Minimum Tax 
Rate (30%) 
Harmonised 
Tax Rate (33%) 
Harmonised 
Tax Rate 
(20%) 
AUT -0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 -0.41 
BLU 0.23 -0.15 0.02 -0.07 -0.59 
DNK -0.09 -0.28 0.03 0.02 -0.71 
FIN 0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.11 -0.18 
FRA -0.07 -0.15 0.01 -0.02 -0.69 
DEU 0.21 0.15 0.01 0.25 0.13 
GRC -0.18 -0.19 0.00 -0.06 -0.70 
IRL -0.10 -0.22 -0.28 -0.46 -0.22 
ITA -0.10 -0.13 0.01 -0.10 -0.75 
NLD 0.30 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.06 
PRT -0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.25 
ESP -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.26 
SWE -0.19 -0.41 0.06 0.09 -0.84 
GBR 0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.11 
CZE -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 
HUN -0.05 -0.09 -0.14 -0.28 -0.06 
POL -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.15 -0.03 
EU  -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.29 
      
Table A1.3: Economic Effects of a Common Consolidated Tax Base 
        
 CIT L-Tax W L K Y Welfare 
 %-GDP %-Point % % % % %-GDP 
IRL -0.37 0.20 0.79 0.28 0.52 0.44 0.06 
HUN -0.17 -0.14 0.53 0.23 1.04 0.36 0.22 
POL -0.07 -0.18 0.42 0.19 0.86 0.25 0.23 
SWE 0.03 -0.21 0.05 0.08 -0.14 0.06 0.21 
CZE -0.01 -0.13 0.16 0.08 0.33 0.12 0.11 
FIN -0.31 0.21 0.57 0.05 1.17 0.41 0.11 
DNK -0.05 -0.02 0.12 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.11 
GBR -0.14 0.01 0.36 0.06 1.04 0.27 0.18 
PRT 0.19 -0.29 -0.11 0.04 -0.40 -0.04 0.16 
BLU -0.19 -0.09 0.51 0.11 1.19 0.56 0.37 
AUT 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.17 -0.05 0.02 
NLD -0.26 0.23 0.51 -0.09 1.45 0.33 0.21 
GRC 0.25 0.03 -0.77 -0.14 -1.51 -0.72 -0.40 
ESP 0.06 -0.04 -0.12 -0.02 -0.26 -0.09 -0.02 
FRA 0.01 0.19 -0.08 -0.17 -0.29 -0.19 -0.11 
ITA 0.25 0.10 -0.68 -0.23 -1.34 -0.71 -0.33 
DEU -0.56 0.48 0.95 0.03 2.62 0.76 0.12 
EU -0.07 0.11 0.18 -0.01 0.51 0.10 0.02 
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APPENDIX 2: 
DOCUMENTATION OF 
CORTAX 
 CORTAX considers the stationary, long-run equilibrium of a 
dynamic, general equilibrium framework. The specification of this 
model is heavily inspired by the OECDTAX-model of Sørensen 
(2001). Consumption and labour supply decisions by households are 
derived from the maximisation of lifetime utility. Two types of firms 
are distinguished: domestic firms and multinationals. The latter firms 
operate in several countries, giving them the opportunity to shift 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Decisions of each firm are derived 
from the maximisation of its value. 
A2.1 
Introduction
We first describe the main features of the model.1 Thereafter, the 
modelling is briefly discussed per sector. Attention is in particular 
given to the specification and calibration of corporate taxation. 
 
 The model aims to cover all the EU member states, provided the 
required data are available. Since data are insufficient for 
Luxemburg, it is combined with Belgium. As a third country, we 
model the US. 
A2.2 
Main Features 
of the Model
• All markets are characterised by perfect competition. 
Location specific rents are introduced so that profits are 
not zero. 
• All countries produce one homogenous good at the 
exogenous world price (the net supply by the rest of the 
world (ROW) is assumed perfectly elastic at the given 
price). 
• Two types of assets are traded on the world capital market: 
bonds and equities. Bonds issued in different countries are 
considered perfect substitutes, yielding the same given 
world interest rate. The same holds for equities. An 
individual country cannot affect world interest rates (the 
1 The complete technical documentation of CORTAX is given in Bettendorf and 
Van der Horst (2006). 
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net supply of each asset by ROW is assumed perfectly 
elastic at the given interest rate). 
• We focus on the steady state version of the model. The 
model is running in GAMS. Output is written in Excel-
spreadsheets. 
 
 Following the standard overlapping generations model of 
Diamond, households are assumed to live for two periods. 
Household decisions on consumption and labour supply are derived 
from the maximisation of lifetime utility, which allows for a proper 
welfare analysis. An individual only works when young. Young 
households receive labour income (after taxes) and lump sum 
transfers. The difference between total income and consumption 
expenditures (including taxes) gives total savings. These savings are 
invested in bonds and stocks. Since both asset types are considered 
imperfect substitutes, an investor prefers to diversify his portfolio 
over both assets. Since older households do no work, consumption 
in the second period has to be financed by capital income (net of 
taxes), together with lump sum transfers. 
A2.3 
Households
Calibration is in general based on data from 2005. Consumption 
expenditures are taken from the National Accounts, while labour 
supply is calculated from data on employment in persons and hours. 
Suggested values for the main parameters of the household sector 
are given in Table A.2.1. 
TableA2.1: Key Parameters and (Semi-) Elasticities for Households 
   
  Per Cent 
Population growth   0.5 
Real return on bonds  2.0 
Real return on equity  4.0 
Rate of time preference  1.0 
   
Elasticities of substitution   
Intertemporal  0.5 
Intratemporal (consumption-leisure)  1.0 
Bonds-equity  4.0 
   
Implied (semi-)elasticities Min Max 
Labour supply to wage 0.12 0.28 
Savings to interest rate 0.35 0.80 
The implied semi-elasticities are calculated with a 2002 database with EU15, CZE, 
HUN and POL. 
 
 Two types of firms are distinguished: domestic firms and 
multinationals. A domestic firm only operates in one country. In 
each country a representative multinational headquarters is located 
and each multinational is assumed to own a subsidiary in each 
foreign country. The decisions by each firm are derived from 
maximising its value. 
A2.4 
Firms 
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Production in each firm uses three primary factors: labour, 
internationally mobile capital and location specific capital. Location 
specific capital is supplied perfectly inelastically and is internationally 
immobile. Since its return, being a rent, is part of the corporate tax 
base, as also this type of capital motivates a lower bound on the 
corporate income tax rate. Fixed income is assumed to accrue to the 
residents of the home country. In this way a tax export channel is 
incorporated, as host countries impose the corporate income tax on 
this income flow. 
Labour is also assumed to be internationally immobile, implying 
that firms have to compete for labour on the local market. In 
contrast, capital is perfectly mobile internationally. Although the 
gross rate of return is fixed at the world capital market, the user cost 
of capital depends on country specific corporate and personal 
taxation systems. Investments can be financed by issuing bonds or 
by retaining profits (issuing new shares is not allowed). The equity 
capital of a subsidiary (defined as FDI) is provided by its parent. The 
optimal financing mix depends on the difference between the cost of 
debt financing (after corporate taxation) and the required return on 
retained profits. The latter is determined by the marginal equity 
holder, which is assumed to live in the home country. As a 
consequence, the required return on the firms’ equity is determined 
by the tax rate the domestic household has to pay on equity income. 
As debt financing is in general tax-favoured, extreme debt positions 
are avoided by specifying financial distress costs that increase in the 
debt ratio. 
Production in a subsidiary needs in addition an intermediate 
input that is provided by its parent company. A headquarters can 
charge a transfer price for these inputs that deviates from the real 
cost. When tax bases are not consolidated, a multinational has an 
incentive to shift profits to low-tax countries by setting a low 
transfer price. Profit shifting remains bounded by specifying that a 
multinational has to incur extra costs when applying transfer pricing. 
Corporate taxation issues are further discussed in the next 
subsection. 
Table A2.2: Key Parameters and (Semi-) Elasticities of the Production Function 
   
  Per Cent 
Technological growth  1.5 
Economic rate of depreciation  5.0 
Income share of location specific capital  2.5 
Income share intermediate inputs in subsidiaries  10.0 
Elasticities of substitution between labour and capital  0.7 
   
Implied (semi-)elasticities Min Max 
Capital stock to statutory CIT 0.46 0.09 
Incoming FDI to statutory CIT -0.91 -0.48 
Debt to statutory CIT 0.23 0.38 
Incoming transfer price to statutory CIT 0.74 2.17 
The implied semi-elasticities are calculated with a 2002 database with EU15, CZE, HUN and POL. 
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The calibration of the firm sector is summarised in Table A2.2. 
The capital and labour parameters in the production functions are 
determined by country specific labour income shares (corrected for 
the self-employed). Country specific TFP-levels are calibrated from 
figures on GDP per worker. We follow Sørensen (2001) in 
specifying that domestic firms use location specific capital about 
twice as much as multinational headquarters (the precise figure is 
0.7/0.3). The amount of location specific capital used by each 
subsidiary is calibrated from data on bilateral FDI-stocks. 
 
 We consider two basic principles for taxing corporate income: the 
source and the residence principle. Next, we explain the modelling 
of the consolidation systems with formula apportionment. In the last 
subsection, the specification and calibration of compliance costs are 
described. 
A2.5 
Corporate 
Taxation
 
 In the base case all EU-countries tax corporate income on a source 
basis. The tax base is defined as the value of output (including the 
value of intermediate inputs for a multinational headquarters), minus 
the wage sum, interest payments on debt and depreciation 
allowances (minus the value of intermediate inputs for a subsidiary). 
Depreciation allowances are assumed to be a fraction of the capital 
stock. The broadness of the tax base differs over EU-countries by 
calibrating a country-specific value for this rate of tax allowances. 
The calibration of the tax parameters in the EU is discussed below. 
A2.6 
Source or 
Residence 
Principle
The US adopts the world-wide residence principle (alternatively 
known as the method of world-wide credit, see Sørensen (2001)). 
The US taxes the total corporate income of its multinationals if the 
tax bill according to the US-tax rules exceeds the sum of the taxes 
paid by the parent and all subsidiaries in the source countries. 
 
 The key parameters of the CIT system are the statutory tax rate 
and the fiscal depreciation rate (i.e. the tax allowance rate). The legal 
tax rates are taken from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS, update 
from Devereux et al., 2002), except for CZE, HUN and POL 
(source: Finkenzeller and Spengel (2004)) and DNK (source: Nexia 
International (2005)). The starting point in the calibration of the tax 
base is the marginal effective tax rate (METR) as calculated by the 
IFS. We take the METR for the case where 25 per cent of new 
investments are financed with debt and 75 per cent with equity. This 
is lower than the actual debt-equity mix (40 per cent, 60 per cent) in 
order to ensure reasonable (depreciation) allowances. The rate of tax 
allowances, which encompass all kinds of tax deductions, is 
calibrated such that this METR is reproduced, as it is the best 
measure of how corporate income taxes affect marginal investments. 
We restrict the tax allowance rate between 5 per cent and 15 per 
cent, where the lower bound is given by the economic rate of 
A2.7 
Calibration of 
the CIT Systems
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depreciation and the upper bound is imposed to avoid the 
undesirable ‘taxation paradox’: when one allows for generous tax 
allowances (large difference between fiscal and economic rate of 
depreciation), simulating a reduction in the corporate tax rate might 
result in an increase in the cost of capital and a reduction of the 
capital stock (see Sørensen, 2002). 
 
 Consolidation of the tax base for a multinational simply amounts 
to summing the tax bases of all firms that are located in a 
participating country. In all consolidation scenarios, the tax base is 
defined under one single set of tax rules. 
A2.8 
Consolidation 
and Formula 
Apportionment  
 A motivation for tax base consolidation is to reduce tax 
compliance costs for multinationals. The European Commission 
(2004) reports extensive evidence on perceived compliance costs 
(these include costs required for company taxation and VAT, 
together with costs voluntarily incurred to minimise taxes). 
Compliance costs are estimated at 1.9 per cent and 30.9 per cent of 
taxes paid by large firms and SMEs, respectively.2 Costs are larger 
for firms with subsidiaries. The European Commission (2001) 
focuses on costs related to transfer pricing. Estimates of annual 
compliance costs range from 1 to 2 million euro for the group of 
medium-sized enterprises and 4 to 5.5 million euro for large 
multinational enterprises. Compliance costs of 7.5 million euro 
amount to 3 per cent of CIT revenues. Devereux (2004) concludes 
from this EU report that compliance costs likely range between 2.7 
per cent and 4 per cent of CIT revenues. 
A2.9 
Compliance 
Costs for 
Companies 
As evidence suggests that compliance costs decrease relatively 
with the size of the firms, these costs could be modelled as a fixed 
cost. The disadvantage of this specification is that a reduction of 
compliance costs will not directly affect any of the firm’s decisions. 
This simulation will only result in a direct, positive effect on the 
output volume when compliance costs are modelled as a variable 
cost. We, therefore, prefer to model these costs by introducing a new 
type of ‘unproductive’ worker, which are needed to keep the tax 
administration. This overhead labour is specified as a fixed fraction 
of the productive workers, increasing the wage cost by this fraction. 
Since neither firm specific, nor country specific figures are 
available, the fraction of overhead labour is kept the same for all 
firms. This fraction is calibrated at 0.43 per cent, such that the 
simulated compliance costs amount to 10 per cent of the CIT-
revenues in the EU.3 When simulating a switch to the FA-system, 
compliance costs are abolished for all subsidiaries. 
 
 
2 Small- and medium-sized enterprises are defined as companies with less than 250 
employees. 
3 This value results from an older calibration with 2002-data for EU15, CZE, HUN 
and POL. 
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Besides taxes on corporate income, tax revenues consist of 
residence-based taxes on labour income, dividends, capital gains, 
interest income and consumption. The expenditure side contains 
government consumption, interest payments on public debt, tax 
collection costs and lump sum transfers. Government consumption 
as well as public debt is a constant fraction of GDP. 
A2.10 
Rest of the 
Government 
Government behaviour is exogenously specified. When tax 
revenues change after a reform, the specified marginal source of 
finance is adjusted to close the government budget. Possible 
compensation mechanisms include the lump sum transfers, the 
consumption tax rate and the labour income tax rate. 
 
 Equilibrium must hold on each market: A2.11 
General 
Equilibrium
 
• The labour market: the country specific wage adjusts to 
ensure that domestic supply meets domestic demand. 
• The goods market: the surplus of production over 
domestic demand leads to net exports; the rest of the 
world is willing to absorb any volume of net exports at the 
fixed world price. The goods price acts as numeraire. 
• The bonds market: all types of bonds (domestic or foreign, 
issued by firms or government) are perfect substitutes with 
a fixed return; the net supply of bonds by the rest of world 
is assumed to be perfectly elastic. 
• The equity market: all types of equity (domestic or foreign) 
are perfect substitutes with a fixed return; the net supply of 
equity by the rest of the world is assumed to be perfectly 
elastic. 
• The current account equals the change in the net foreign 
asset position (on the balance of payments) if all previous 
markets are in equilibrium (due to Walras law). 
 
 
  
